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Abstract 
Background: After the introduction of the general practitioner (GP) scheme in 2001, 
many GPs did not achieve their preferred list size, and experienced patient shortage. 
Patients have imperfect information about GPs. Results in the literature have 
indicated that GPs with inferior quality are more likely to have patient shortage as 
patients choose their GP based on a perception of quality. Previous research has 
established that patient shortage is associated with lower patient satisfaction except 
satisfaction with waiting times. In 2012, the anonymous GP rating site Legelisten was 
established. This service enables people to rate the GP along various dimensions like 
listening skills, opening hours and waiting time. 
 
Objective: To examine whether data from an anonymous rating site where the 
sample is based on self-selection yields similar results as the literature based on 
surveys of a randomized sample. More specifically, we investigate whether patient 
shortage is associated with lower patient satisfaction with the interpersonal 
relationship between patient and GP, and higher satisfaction with waiting times. 
 
Method: The study employs descriptive statistics and multilevel ordinal regression 
analysis in order to investigate the association between patient shortage and patient 
satisfaction when accounting for influence by age, gender and competition.  
 
Results: Patient shortage is associated with lower odds of high satisfaction with the 
interpersonal relationship, and higher odds of high satisfaction with waiting times 
compared with GPs who have full lists.  
 
Conclusion: The results in the analysis based on a self-selected sample are aligned 
with the existing literature indicating that there is an association between patient 
shortage and lower patient satisfaction on dimensions describing the interpersonal 
relationship between the patient and the GP. GPs with patient shortage react by 
offering shorter waiting times, as satisfaction is more likely to be higher on those 
dimensions for the same GPs. The results suggest that the rating site could be useful 
in alleviating the information problem patients face when choosing a GP.  
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1 Introduction 
After the introduction of the regular general practitioner (GP) scheme in 2001, many 
GPs did not achieve their preferred patient list size and experienced patient shortage. 
Economic theory has described how these GPs behave in the market in order to 
attract additional patients by providing income-generating services and shorten their 
waiting times (Godager & Lurås, 2009; Iversen & Lurås, 2000, 2002; Scott, 2000). 
Patients choose GPs with imperfect information, but may be influenced by their 
perception of GP quality. The patients perception of GP quality might influence 
which level of demand the GP faces; patient shortage or filled capacity (Biørn & 
Godager, 2010; Iversen & Lurås, 2011). Literature shows that patient satisfaction with 
their GP tend to be high (Williams, Coyle, & Healy, 1998). Studies in the Norwegian 
context have found that patient satisfaction is lower with the interpersonal 
relationship, and higher with waiting times, when the GP face patient shortage 
(Godager & Iversen, 2010, 2014; Lurås, 2007).  
 
The aim of this study is to explore whether the data applied from an anonymous 
rating website can confirm and contribute to already existing results generated from 
the Norwegian survey of living condition (Godager & Iversen, 2010, 2014; Lurås, 
2007). More specifically, the objective is to analyze the association between patient 
shortage and patient satisfaction on dimensions of the GPs practice describing the 
interpersonal relationship and time use. 
 
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter one describes the background of the term 
patient shortage in the Norwegian context followed by theory regarding the market, 
quality and expected GP behavior when facing patient shortage. Following, how 
patient satisfaction can measure quality and its association with patient shortage is 
presented before stating the working hypotheses. Chapter two presents the applied 
data and relevant variables for the thesis followed by a description of the analysis 
method and the empiric model. Chapter three presents descriptive statistics and 
results from the regression analysis.  Chapter four provides a discussion of the 
results in light of existing research findings, further research and implications, and 
will be summarized with a conclusion. 
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1.1 Background 
In 2001, the general practitioner reform was implemented with the leading purpose 
to improve the quality in primary health care (Ot.prp.nr.99). With this reform 
patients were given a right to be listed with a regular GP, and 77% became enlisted 
with their first choice (Finnvold, Paulsen, & Lurås, 2003). The allocation process was 
a result of the patients preferred choice and the GPs preference of patient list size- 
which they report to the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV). 
When the allocation process was complete, many GPs got fewer patients listed than 
they preferred. The reason why some GPs experienced patient shortage, was that not 
all of them were a popular first choice listing, and in addition there was an 18% 
increase in physician man-years in order to ensure sufficient availability (Grytten, 
2009). The GP payment system consists of 30% per capita, and 70% refund and 
patient copayment (Ot.prp.nr.99). Le Grand (2007) argues that such adjustments 
create a situation where the GPs can compete for patients. When we have a 
competitive market combined with a free choice of GP, certain conditions have to be 
met to ensure that incentives for quality of care are present. There should be excess 
capacity, a sufficient amount of GPs with open lists to ensure that patients have a real 
choice, and available information to base the choice upon. The physicians should be 
provided with incentives to compete for a higher demand through quality, such as 
per capita payment. Further, the patients must be responsive to variation in quality, 
and choose their GP based on this information (Le Grand, 2007). 
“More specifically, for choice to act as an effective driver of quality, it is necessary to rely 
upon the users judgment about the quality and responsiveness of the service and for providers 
to react to choices made on the basis of those judgments” (Le Grand, 2007, p. 117). 
The Norwegian Directorate of Health has documented that people have fewer 
available choices in the GP market now, compared to the beginning of the reform 
when there was a high proportion of GPs experiencing patient shortage (Gaardsrud, 
2012). The percentage of GPs with open lists has decreased from 2001 to 2012 from 
59.6% to 40. 1% respectively.  In the same period, the proportion of GPs with patient 
shortage has decreased from 11.2% to 5.5%. Ordinary GP switching, which mean a 
switch of GP without changing the address, has also decreased from 5.3% to 1.6% 
and is highest in Oslo with 2.2%. In the rural areas on the other hand, the proportion 
of municipalities with fewer than two GPs with open lists has decreased from 146 to 
116 (Gaardsrud, 2012). Regarding the available information about quality, there has 
not been any substantial change since the reform. It is a common belief that patient 
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choice might drive quality. However, there exist few indicators for patients to base 
their choice upon. Although the government has been monitoring certain quality 
indicators and patient satisfaction with the GP scheme, none of this information is 
public. Patients may choose a GP based on information of list size and the number of 
vacancies on the list.  
 
After the private rating site Legelisten.no was launched in 2012, many people have 
chosen to rate their GPs. The ratings provide people with information relevant for 
choosing a GP dependent on whether they trust the information provided. Further it 
is an additional information source regarding the association between patient 
satisfaction and patient shortage, which have been explored earlier based on the 
Norwegian survey of living conditions (Godager & Iversen, 2010, 2014; Lurås, 2007). 
Although the previous studies are of a different character, satisfaction measures on 
Legelisten are aligned with, and contribute to these results. 
1.2 Demand and quality in the market for general practitioners  
The market for health care services deviates from a perfectly competitive market. 
Pauly and Satterthwaite (1979) refer to services provided by GPs as reputation goods. 
A market consists of reputation goods if it consists of differentiated services, and 
consumers gain information of the services through its reputation in their network. 
The primary market is normally thought to be monopolistic competitive as the 
providers can set the price and influence quality attributes within a limited range, 
and consumers have imperfect information about the providers and their services. 
When the number of providers increase, consumers have less information on the 
individual GPs (Pauly & Satterthwaite, 1979). McCarthy (1985) hypothesizes that 
competition alleviates the information problem because it drives the providers to 
increase the amount of information, and reports significant findings where patients 
are sensitive to price, scheduling practice and quality. If patients are able to 
distinguish between quality, then demand and price is likely to be higher for GPs 
who are of higher quality (Dranove & White, 1986). 
 
The effects of competition on quality can take two directions. Gaynor (2006) argues 
that when the market is characterized by price regulation, providers must compete 
through quality. It is further pointed out that this combination of competition and 
price regulation can result in high quality (Gaynor, 2006). This theory is supported 
by several studies focusing on the market of hospitals (Gaynor, Moreno-Serra, & 
	  4	  
Propper, 2013).  Dranove and Satterthwaite (2000) argue that when patients search 
for a physician of their choice, the information about quality may be noisy. Patients 
are able to correct for contaminating noise in their observations, although not 
perfectly so. The more noise in an attribute, the less responsive the patient becomes. 
 
Competition might not necessarily have a positive effect on quality. Patients have 
imperfect information of the providers, and have previously been associated with 
being poor judges of technical quality (Arrow, 1963; Dranove & White, 1986). Pauly 
(2004) discusses how the impact of competition on quality depends on the ability to 
judge quality and what incentives are given through the payment system. Propper, 
Burgess, and Green (2004) found that competition decreased quality after a reform in 
England, supporting the theory that when quality signals are weak or noisy, quality 
may be reduced. Dranove and Satterthwaite (1992) and Gaynor (2006) argue that 
competition may result in decreasing quality when the demand side is unresponsive 
to changes in quality. However, the long term relationship between a patient and a 
physician provides the patient with monitoring opportunities, which increases their 
information and ability to make judgments on both technical quality, waiting times 
and preferable characteristics. Because of this, it is in the physicians best interest to 
provide the best possible service in order to keep patients, and build up a positive 
reputation to increase demand (Dranove & White, 1986). Patients may accumulate 
knowledge about the physician with time and experience, reducing the information 
gap (Godager, Iversen, & Ma, 2012; Gravelle & Masiero, 2000; Scott, 2000). 
 
Theory suggests that whether patients are able to judge quality and whether it affects 
demand are important empirical questions. Gravelle, Propper, and Santos (2013) did 
a study in England on whether an increase in quality affects demand among primary 
physicians. A portion of the physicians in one market area increased the quality on 
chosen measurable quality indicators. As a result, demand for those physicians 
increased by 15%. Amongst published and unpublished indicators, the patients were 
most responsive towards published quality indicators. Biørn and Godager (2010) 
have also conducted a study on whether quality affects patients demand.  They 
assume that when information on GPs is limited, patients are not affected by e.g. 
mortality rates directly. But they hypothesize in their study that patients have 
perceptions of the latent variable quality, which influences their choice of GP. Their 
findings indicate that patients are responsive to a GPs quality level, and this 
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influences demand. Theory on how patients may be able to sort out noise and 
distinguish between different quality levels is illuminated below. 
 
We may consider a market where N patients have imperfect information when 
choosing between two, with the exception of quality, identical GPs. One of the GPs 
supply services of high quality 𝐻 ,  and the other low quality (𝐿),  but due to 
imperfect information, it is not possible for the consumer to perfectly observe quality. 
Each GP has the capacity to enlist a maximum number of patients denoted by 𝑛max. 
We assume that the two physicians are capable of serving the whole market, 
implying that 2nmax>N. The demand side, consisting of 𝑁 patients, has to make a 
choice between the two of them without having perfect information about which 
physician is of quality 𝐻 or 𝐿. Noise and error cause the GP of low quality to achieve 
some demand for their service 0 < 𝑛L. But as experience and reputation relieve some 
of the imperfect information, the high quality GP will have higher demand nL<nH. 
 
Biørn and Godager (2010, p. 843) describe quality as being distinguishable between 
true, unknown quality 𝜇j of GP 𝐽   𝐽 = 𝐿,𝐻  and perceived quality qij by the consumer 𝑖   𝑖 = 1, . . ,𝑁 .   The relation between the true and perceived quality may be expressed 
as qij=𝜇j+𝜖ij where 𝜖ij denotes noise and measurement error. Conditional on 𝜇j the 
probability that consumer 𝑖  chooses GP   𝐽  can now be expressed as 
 PiH=P(𝜇H+𝜖iH>𝜇L+𝜖iL)=P(𝜖iL<𝜇H-𝜇L+𝜖IH)        (1) 
The assumptions we make for the noise term 𝜖ij leads to different choice models. If 
we assume 𝜖ij to be independent and to follow an extreme value distribution of type 
1, we will consider choice probabilities consistent with the logit type model.  
Following, we get the expression, similar to Train (2003, p. 78);    
 PiH= !!"!!"  !!!"        PiL= !!"!!"!!!"                 (2) 
From this model we may express expected demand for a GP of high quality as NPiH 
with the following predictions: GPs of higher quality have a higher probability of 
being chosen by consumers, PIH>PIL and therefore also higher likelihood of achieving 
the maximum list size nH=nmax than what is the case for the GPs of low quality. Then 
it logically follows that GPs of low quality have a higher probability of facing patient 
shortage, nL<nmax (Biørn & Godager, 2010, p. 844). This situation might look as 
described by Becker (1991) where some firms may experience excess demand, which 
can be a sign of quality, and thus accumulate even higher demand. Firms like this 
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profit on keeping their prices fixed, and establishing a queuing system. The other 
firms of lower quality, experiencing patient shortage, profit on lowering their prices, 
creating multiple equilibria in the market. 
 
1.3 GPs decision problem when facing patient shortage 
In Norway, the physician market is regulated by fixed prices and many patients are 
exempt from co-payment. As a result, price cannot be used as a competitive device, 
and thus GPs must compete on quality (Gravelle & Masiero, 2000). The GP scheme 
encourages competition over patients in general, and especially GPs who experience 
patient shortage may seek to attract patients by improving accessibility, offering 
more services and shorter waiting times (Iversen & Lurås, 2002).  The study of this 
decision problem is unique to the Norwegian context, as both the GPs preferred list 
size and actual patient list size is registered. This data allows us to describe GPs 
behavior with and without patient shortage. 
1.3.1 Income motivated behavior 
Economic models describing GP behavior come in many varieties. Common for 
many models is that they include economical incentives, and preference for leisure as 
part of the physician objective function. They often include an ethical argument as 
well (Scott, 2000). Iversen and Lurås (2000), Iversen (2004), Iversen and Lurås (2002) 
and Godager and Lurås (2009) have contributed to the literature on income 
motivated behavior relevant for the Norwegian market, when GPs are facing patient 
shortage. Income motivated behavior is a term for when a physician, facing patient 
shortage, provides more service compared to unconstrained colleagues, and when 
this high intensive service is a result of the deficit in their preferred practice profile. 
GPs preferred list size reveals their preferred practice style. A preferred list size 
higher than the actual list size indicates a wish of less leisure and a higher workload, 
possibly leading to less time with each patient.  When a GP faces patient shortage, 
she has more motivation for adjusting the variables under her control. The GP may 
provide more services, and devote more time to each patient (Iversen, 2004; Iversen 
& Lurås, 2000).  
1.3.1.1 Service provision 
The three papers (Godager & Lurås, 2009; Iversen, 2004; Iversen & Lurås, 2000) all 
include an ethical argument in their models. The ethical argument describes how the 
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appropriate service intensity is not always clear, but is constrained within the ethical 
conduct, thus we have a gray area in the acceptable range of service provision. 
Marginal health benefit of health care service is assumed to be a declining function of 
service volume, but within the gray area, each practice profile is considered equally 
appropriate. It is only within this gray area that income motivated behavior applies.  
In the models, the physicians practice profile can be described by the number 𝑛 of 
patients on the list, and 𝑛max, which is the maximum number that may be enlisted. 
The physician may serve less than the maximum number of patients 0< 𝑛 ≤ 𝑛max. If 
the physician wishes to enlist more patients, then the constraint becomes binding at 𝑛 = 𝑛max and the physician faces patient shortage. The gray area is included in the 
models by limiting service volume to a certain bounded range [S1, S2], where S1< S2 
and are exogenous to the physician. It is assumed that the provided service volume s 
is produced until the marginal effect equals zero and must be within the interval S1≤ 
s ≤ S2.  When we have a combined payment system consisting of a capitation system 
and a fee for service system, the size of capitation relative to fee for service decides 
the optimal service provision. For a physician not facing patient shortage, an 
additional service has an opportunity cost of reduced income that may have been 
collected from capitation. When this opportunity cost becomes significant, the 
optimal value of services will be s=S1, where only a minimum of services will be 
provided. The physician is able to keep the payoff from 𝑛𝑠 constant by reducing 𝑠 
and raising 𝑛.  Physicians facing patient shortage, have lower opportunity costs 
relative to capitation because of lower 𝑛 and have incentives to increase service 
volume closer to s=S2 (Godager & Lurås, 2009; Iversen, 2004; Iversen & Lurås, 2000). 
Iversen and Lurås (2000) conclude that physicians with patient shortage generated 
higher income and more frequent consultations and laboratory tests than 
unconstrained physicians. This hypothesis gains further support in Iversen (2004) 
where the long term effect after five years, showed that constrained physicians 
provided 15 % more services per patient.  Godager and Lurås (2009) found that GPs 
who experience a shortage of patients provide more community health service 
compared to their colleagues. Kann, Biørn, and Lurås (2010) studied service and 
prescription intensity amongst elderly and found that GPs under competition and 
facing patient shortage provided more consultations and services compared to their 
colleagues. 
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1.3.1.2 Waiting time 
The physicians optimal waiting time is the focus of several papers. Previous 
international studies have shown that it is more favorable for the physicians to have 
longer waiting times than short. This is modeled through the physicians costs, which 
increase with the number and length of the consultations, and decrease with longer 
waiting time. The waiting time tends to become shorter when there is more 
competition between physicians (Mueller, 1985; Sloan & Lorant, 1977). Godager and 
Iversen (2010) have provided evidence that support the theory that competition 
reduces waiting time. They argue in their analysis of the Norwegian living condition 
survey, that those counties with a high proportion of GPs with patient shortage, 
cause a competitive situation where the GPs have extra incentives towards reducing 
waiting times in order to avoid GP switching.  However this effect changed over 
time. At the end of the period of 2002 to 2008, there was no longer a statistical 
difference in waiting times on municipality level dependent on the proportion of the 
GPs with patient shortage in each county.  In the following survey in 2012, waiting 
time within municipalities with a higher share of GPs experiencing patient shortage 
was significantly lower (Godager & Iversen, 2014). 	  
Iversen and Lurås (2002) have modified the model for optimal waiting time 
according to the Norwegian context.  In their model, the GP has a choice problem 
concerning leisure and income. When the price is given, they may choose their 
preferred patients 𝑛, the intensity of service provision 𝑠 and waiting time 𝑤. Service 
volume 𝑠 is assumed to be dependent on waiting time 𝑤, i.e. when a practice has 
long waiting times, there will be less service per patient as patients seek treatment 
elsewhere or recover on their own. Waiting time is dependent on leisure and the 
amount of patients. The optimal level of patients and leisure is determined by the 
marginal utility for leisure, which depends on a mix of capitation and fee for service. 
Waiting time is assumed to be a function of the number of patients and leisure but is 
constrained by a maximum wait of 0 < 𝑤 𝑛, 𝑙 ≤ 𝑤max.  The optimal number of 
patients and leisure time is further constrained by the demand, which mainly 
consists of exogenous arguments such as GP characteristics combined with the 
composition of other GPs in the market. When the GPs funding is a mixed system, 
high 𝑛 is associated with maximum waiting time 𝑤max. Low 𝑛  is associated with low 𝑤 . When a significantly sized shortage of patients emerges, the GP has an 
involuntary increase of leisure. Since the GP has preferences regarding income and 
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leisure, they have some choices. When the marginal utility of income is higher than 
the marginal utility of leisure, the optimal waiting time may be reduced in order to 
increase income from fees, and attract new patients to the list, thereby increasing 
income from capitation. In Iversen and Lurås (2002), the physicians, who do not face 
a patient constraint, offer a longer waiting time. This is driven by the stochastic 
demand for consultation; by increasing the waiting time, a smooth demand and 
higher remuneration per hour may be achieved. Iversen and Lurås (2002) found that 
physicians experiencing patient shortage, offered an almost 40% lower waiting time, 
and these physicians also experienced an increase in enlisted patients the next 
period. An interpretation of this observation is that their effort towards attracting 
new patients was successful. Iversen and Lurås (2002) conclude that unconstrained 
physicians are considered to provide higher quality services compared to physicians 
with patient shortage. Thus only physicians considered to be of inferior quality 
choose to compete by reducing waiting time. Therefore, as physicians vary in quality, 
in the eyes of the patients, we can expect a market situation with a wide range of 
waiting times. 	  
1.4 Patient satisfaction as a proxy for quality 
“Like beauty, quality is at least partly in the beholders eye. It has two aspects; quality of 
action and quality of perception” (Vuori, 1991, p. 189). How to best assess quality in 
healthcare has gained much attention. Traditionally, quality has been assessed 
addressing the structure, process and outcome from the experts’ perspective. In the 
recent years, there has been a movement towards including the patient perspective 
(Chow, Mayer, Darzi, & Athanasiou, 2009; Sullivan, 2003). The three categories of, 
structure, process and outcome were first introduced as the source of inference about 
quality in healthcare by Donabedian (1966). Structure denotes the material, human 
resources and organizational structure in the relevant setting. Process denotes how 
and what diagnosis and treatment was implemented. Outcome denotes the health 
status after receiving treatment, and if broadly defined, includes patient satisfaction 
(Donabedian, 1966, 1988). Donabedian (1988) further explains that patient 
satisfaction may be considered to be part of the health status and a desired outcome 
of quality care.  Whether a patient is satisfied or dissatisfied provides information in 
all the categories for quality assessment, technical quality, as well as the 
interpersonal relationship between the patient and physician. The interpersonal 
quality might be equally important as the technical quality, as it is the base for 
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successful diagnosis and implementation of treatment. Therefore, patient satisfaction 
should be considered a valid quality indicator no matter its strength and weaknesses 
(Donabedian, 1988). The view that patient satisfaction is a valid indicator for quality 
has gained a massive support over the years (Aharony & Strasser, 1993; Ford, Bach, 
& Fottler, 1997; Hekkert, Cihangir, Kleefstra, van den Berg, & Kool, 2009; Sitzia & 
Wood, 1997; B. Williams et al., 1998). Vuori (1991) argues, that patient satisfaction is 
not only a proxy for quality, but also an essential part of quality. However, some 
have claimed reasons for being skeptic. Patients ability to judge the quality of 
healthcare has been questioned, and this has implications for whether the satisfaction 
of health care is a measure of quality health care (Pascoe, 1983). Some of the concerns 
have been that satisfaction is merely a reflection of individual emotional need, rather 
than quality of care and does not correspond to an objective measure. The deviance 
from objective measures is not necessarily a weakness however. It is the core strength 
of satisfaction measures, as we seek to capture something more. Together with the 
choice of GP, empirical evidence points to patients being sensitive to the difference 
between provider qualities and mere courtesy, and make their satisfaction rating 
with this in mind. In fact, the patients’ satisfaction tends to be aligned with the 
professionals’ own evaluation of quality. Patient satisfaction contributes with a 
valuable perspective that balances the objective structure, process and outcome, and 
serves as an outcome measure of the quality of the received health care (Pascoe, 1983; 
Ware, Snyder, Wright, & Davies, 1983). 
1.4.1 Components and determinants influence patient satisfaction 
Patient satisfaction is a complex concept widely debated in the literature. Numerous 
different definitions have been proposed with different emphasis on what it actually 
consists of, and what it captures (Sitzia & Wood, 1997; Williams, 1994; Williams et al., 
1998).  Chow et al. (2009, p. 436) describe patient satisfaction in terms of healthcare 
simply as “the degree to which a patient feels they have received high-quality of care. If a 
patient feels they have received high-quality care, they are more likely to be satisfied”.  With a 
simple definition such as this, it must be further pointed out that patient satisfaction 
is a subjective and a twofold measure consisting of satisfaction components and 
satisfaction determinants (Ware et al., 1983). Satisfaction components denote the 
actual received care, while satisfaction determinants denote the subjective part where 
patient characteristics and expectations have an influence.  The higher the 
expectations, the more likely the patients are to be dissatisfied, although some of the 
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literature argues that the expectation is only a minor part of the actual satisfaction 
level (Ware et al., 1983).  
 
Previous patient satisfaction studies have in general reported high satisfaction with 
healthcare (Williams, 1994). This has led to questioning whether it is worth 
measuring at all. However, more differences and dissatisfaction are elicited when 
specific components of the GP practice are investigated more carefully (Chow et al., 
2009; Vuori, 1991). It seems that having information about the physician before 
choosing one, and the patient-physician relationship is associated with high patient 
satisfaction. This was highlighted by Wolinsky and Steiber (1982), who reported that 
patients considered the physicians reputation in their network, and satisfaction with 
the GPs interpersonal skills as the most important factors when choosing a doctor. 
Baker (1990) found three important categories related to general satisfaction: the 
degree to which the patients trusted the doctors advice, the level of relevant 
information given and the perception of being given sufficient time. Williams and 
Calnan (1991) reported from a study in England high scores on communication and 
professional skills and lower satisfaction with trust, information and consultation 
length. Related, Gandhi et.al (1997) found from a qualitative study that the main 
reasons why people changed their physicians in England was accessibility and 
attitudinal problems concerning the physician being rude and lacking interest during 
the consultation. Scott and Vick (1999) found that satisfaction is dependent on 
communication, thorough explanation, quality of information and waiting times. 
Also McGlone, Butler, and McGlone (2002) identified the importance of the patient-
physician relationship, the physicians’ ability to communicate and understand, and 
the time devoted to each patient, as the most important factors for satisfaction. Even 
though people report various practice characteristics as influencing their choice of 
GP, evidence suggest that patient satisfaction is the most influenced by the doctor-
patient relationship (Pascoe, 1983; Scott, 2000). Bornstein, Marcus, and Cassidy (2000) 
have reported slightly different results as they found the most important reasons for 
choosing and changing doctors relate to instrumental medical skills and office 
management such as waiting time. Physician characteristics such as age and gender 
contributed the least.  An important weakness of this study is that aspects of the 
interpersonal relationship were not included as a choice, which might explain the 
results. The effects of competition and whether it drives higher quality and 
satisfaction have also been studied. As stated above, competition can increase quality 
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in a price-regulated market (Gaynor 2006).  Pike (2010) studied both clinical quality 
and patient satisfaction in England and found that GPs facing higher competition 
within a 500 meters radius had increased measures on both of the outcomes. 
 
Patient demographics are a part of the determinants for satisfaction, but the literature 
is not entirely consistent on what type of characteristics that influence satisfaction the 
most (Carr-Hill, 1992). Patient age, sex, ethnicity and socio- demographic status have 
been of particular interest with various results. Age has shown the most consistency, 
where the elderly are more satisfied than the young (Hall & Dornan, 1990; Pascoe, 
1983; Sivertsen, 2014; Williams & Calnan, 1991).  Differences between the genders are 
more ambiguous, where males are found to be more satisfied than females (Williams 
& Calnan, 1991), females more satisfied than males (Pascoe, 1983), and no difference 
between genders at all (Hall & Dornan, 1990).  Sivertsen (2014) reports mixed results 
where males are more satisfied only with the GP dimensions regarding availability. 
Literature regarding GP characteristics can also be found.  Lurås (2004) reported that 
people seemed to prefer older GPs during the implementation of the general 
practitioner scheme. More recently, Gravelle et al. (2013) argued that the preference 
for GP is moving towards female doctors and younger aged doctors. The latter is 
supported by Sivertsen (2014). Furthermore, satisfaction might be influenced by the 
combination of patient and GP characteristics. Godager (2012) did a study on 
revealed preferences based on the introduction of the general practitioner scheme.  
Based on his findings he argues that patients in general prefer a GP who possesses 
similar observable characteristics, such as age and gender, as them selves. The 
reasoning behind this is that finding a GP that matches relieves some of the possible 
agency imperfections. It is likely that communication in the consultation works better 
regarding diagnosis and treatment decisions when the patient and GP resemble one 
another. Similar findings is also reported in Sivertsen (2014), based on the same data 
as the current study, that patients who have GPs that resemble themselves are more 
satisfied. 
1.4.2 Patient satisfaction and its association with patient shortage 
Satisfaction studies relating to patient shortage have not been common 
internationally, thus the primary literature is from the recent years in the Norwegian 
context. In Lurås (2007) the Norwegian survey of living conditions measuring 
peoples satisfaction with their GP was applied. The results suggest that patients 
	   13	  
enlisted with GPs experiencing patient shortage were less satisfied with the GPs 
interpersonal skills, medical skills, referral skills and consultation length. Also, the 
same GPs were measured with higher satisfaction levels on waiting time, although 
this had little effect on the general satisfaction level. These results indicate that 
patient shortage is associated with the GPs personality and practice style, which, is 
supported by Godager and Iversen (2010) who also analyzed the Norwegian survey 
of living conditions. In general, they found that patient satisfaction has decreased 
over the time period from 2002 to 2008 in relation to the patient-GP relationship, 
while satisfaction with booking time, the time between contact and consultation, has 
increased. The respondents listed with a GP experiencing patient shortage had lower 
satisfaction levels on issues regarding the patient-doctor interpersonal relationship, 
than responders with a GP with a full list. This difference remained in the follow up 
study (Godager & Iversen, 2014). In the period of 2002 to 2008, Godager and Iversen 
(2010) registered both an actual reduction in booking time, and higher satisfaction 
level with booking time with the GPs facing patient shortage, compared to the 
unconstrained GPs. The registered difference with booking time has started to level 
out between the two groups of GPs, which might be a result of a decreasing 
proportion of GPs with patient shortage. In the following study, there were no longer 
a statistically significant difference in booking time between the two GP groups, 
which also is reflected by the satisfaction levels (Godager & Iversen, 2014). 
 
In her study, Lurås (2007), expected that GPs would shorten the waiting times and 
increase the length of consultation when faced with patient shortage, based on earlier 
results by Iversen and Lurås (2002). The fact that satisfaction with consultation length 
was low might indicate that consultation length is associated with a good patient-
doctor relationship, and that this relationship develops over time. This supports the 
early finding in Morrell, Evans, Morris, and Roland (1986) that satisfaction with 
consultation time is a GP dimension linked with physician-patient relationship. 
Howie et.al (1991) report that satisfaction with long consultations was related to the 
doctor being able to recognize and follow up on the patients needs and suggests that 
consultation length could serve as a proxy for quality of care. Bjerrum and Sørensen 
(1992) found that dissatisfaction with the quality of the GP was related to poor 
communication and being given too little time.  All of these findings have in 
common that the length of the consultation is related to satisfaction, but it is the 
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interpersonal quality that drives the length, and is not under direct influence by the 
GP.  
 
These results of patient satisfaction having an association with patient shortage 
contribute to the hypothesis that patient shortage is an indicator of the doctor having 
inferior characteristics from the patients point of view (Iversen & Lurås, 2002). This 
hypothesis gained some further confirmation when Iversen and Lurås (2011) studied 
the related topic of GP switching. Patients have a perception of the GPs quality level. 
They consider whether the GP has inferior characteristics when choosing a GP, 
which is why some GPs are more likely to have patient shortage, which in turn can 
predict the level of expected switching activity in the future. They concluded from 
their results in which they found a 50% higher chance of switching from GPs with 
patient shortage, that patient shortage might be an indicator of inferior GP 
characteristics and practice style. Iversen and Lurås (2011) suggest that since patient 
shortage and GP switching reveals patients preferences for the GP, the level of 
switching activity the GP experiences, should be made public. Another observation 
they made worth mentioning, is that the factors a GP may apply to attract patients, 
such as shorter waiting times, high intensive service and more frequent 
consultations, barely affects the decision of switching GP. Thus it is the satisfaction 
with the interpersonal relationship that has the higher association with general 
satisfaction and decision to stay or switch. Iversen and Lurås (2011) also found that 
those who were allocated to their first choice GPs were less likely to switch at a later 
time. Thus the more information the patient has when choosing the GP, the higher 
satisfaction level and lower chance of switching we can expect. 
 
1.5 Study setting 
This study is based on data collected from a private website rating GPs, which up to 
now was unconventional in this context in Norway. In May 26th, 2012 the website 
Legelisten.no was launched. On this website people can submit anonymous ratings 
of their current or previous GP along several dimensions describing the GP practice 
like service, availability and interpersonal relationship. The ratings are made public 
for other people. This type of ratings has been more common in England and USA, 
and is important to study as it is shown that a large proportion consumers assess the 
online ratings when they choose a healthcare provider (Bardach et.al, 2013) and 
because future support for such sites probably depends on whether they have an 
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association with systematic surveys and quality indicators (Greaves et al., 2012). 
Literature on commercial websites where patients rate general physicians or 
hospitals provide empirical evidence supporting the claim that patient satisfaction in 
such self-selected samples are correlated with a moderate to strong effect with 
randomized sampled surveys and clinical quality indicators (Bardach et al., 2013). 
They have a similar experience in England reported by Greaves et al. (2012). They 
found a relationship between the hospitals objective measures of quality and the 
ratings on the NHS choice website.  Legelisten is the first commercial rating website 
on healthcare in Norway, and by conducting studies based on the data material from 
this site we might gain insight in the usefulness of the rating site and how satisfied 
people are with their GP and on which dimensions does the satisfaction differ. It has 
been said that groups of patients are smarter than the individual, and not 
systematically wrong on information concerning quality (Surowiecki, 2004). 
1.6 Aim of the study 
The main objective of this study is to investigate whether the data applied from 
Legelisten can confirm and contribute to already existing results generated from the 
Norwegian survey of living conditions. More specifically, we will investigate the 
association between patient satisfaction on selected dimensions of the GPs practice 
and patient shortage. We will address this relationship by investigating the following 
two hypotheses: Based on the findings in the satisfaction studies by Lurås (2007), 
(Godager & Iversen, 2010, 2014) and (Iversen & Lurås, 2011) we formulate the first 
hypothesis: 
H1: Patient shortage is associated with lower satisfaction with the GP-patient relationship. 
Based on theory and research findings regarding physician behavior facing patient 
shortage (Godager & Lurås, 2009; Iversen & Lurås, 2000, 2002) and satisfaction 
studies (Godager & Iversen, 2010, 2014; Lurås, 2007), we formulate a second 
hypothesis: 
H2: Patient shortage is associated with higher satisfaction with the GPs waiting times. 
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2 Methodology 
2.1 Data 
We conduct our empirical analysis on data retrieved from Legelisten.no in March 
2013. The dataset consists of anonymous user evaluations of the GP and associated 
practice. This data is linked with observable characteristics of the GP obtained from 
the Norwegian Labour Welfare Administration (NAV). Additionally we obtained 
data from Statistics Norway (SSB) covering age and gender of the Norwegian 
population. Considering the entire dataset is retrieved from public sites consisting of 
anonymous evaluations, this thesis is not notified to the Norwegian Social Science 
Data Service (NSD).  
 
The following analysis is based on a retrospective cross sectional study. We have not 
planned or developed the measured variables, thus our analysis is limited to the 
current variables measured on the website. To enable a certain quality level on the 
evaluations, every submission goes through several screenings, including a 
qualitative one. These screenings ensure written explanations do not violate any 
rules concerning accusations and language. Other technical approaches minimize the 
chance of false submissions. For this thesis, we will only apply published evaluations 
for the analyses, because these are considered the most valid ones.  
2.1.1 Reliability and validity 
Reliability denotes the extent of stability in the measurement, e.g. if the same 
responder surveyed twice produces a consistent result (Sitzia, 1999). The nature of 
our study limits the possibilities to do such testing. Instead we assess the reliability 
on a general level. Donabedian (1966) argues it is common when measuring 
something complex as quality and satisfaction by surveys, to assess reliability by 
agreement among experts. However, little has been written about such assessment of 
self-selected surveys. The use of standardized criteria in the survey serves reliability 
to an extent. We can think of the users as the experts judging the doctors 
performance and reliability depends on the level of agreement among those rating 
the same GP. The difference is that the experts are decentralized and have various 
background and training, which may result in bias. But as Donabedian (1966) points 
out, when studying complex concepts bias should be acknowledged and accounted 
for, instead of treating it as non-existing.  
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Carr-Hill (1992) describes four parameters known to influence response in surveys: 
choice of population, timing of survey, type of questionnaire, and the measurement 
of satisfaction. A description of each of the parameters and how they relate to the 
current study follows. Different populations can have different expectations towards 
the healthcare. Although expectations do play a role, Pascoe (1983) has found that 
this does not lead to bias in surveys. It has also been common to consider different 
social psychological artefacts, which can bias the results such as social desirability 
(Sitzia & Wood, 1997). However, since the responders are anonymous and it is not 
intended to measure satisfaction with a specific treatment, the risk of such biases are 
small (Hekkert et al., 2009). Second, measurements should be done shortly after the 
encounter to avoid bias in recollection, changes in perception and overlooking issues. 
In this study, the sample is self-selected and we do not know how far into the past 
the reviews are. Something internal to the respondent may have changed, and 
relevant pieces of the story forgotten. The patient viewpoint may also be distorted 
due to the type of questionnaire. Closed questions provide us with quantitative 
answers for specific services. Open-ended questions allow the patient to freely 
comment on what they view as important. The ideal is to use both question types in a 
survey measuring satisfaction (Chow et al., 2009). This is especially because 
quantitative ratings tend to be more positive, while open ended questions tend to 
generate more negative responses (Aharony & Strasser, 1993). The website uses both 
types of questions, which improves the quality of data. Everybody can view how 
many stars the GP has received on a specific service, along with a general qualitative 
description. Only the quantitative responses will be analyzed in this study, but a 
study comparing the reliability between the quantitative and qualitative description 
could be conducted in further analyses. The fourth and final parameter described by 
Carr-Hill (1992) refers to measurement. The measurement of satisfaction is executed 
by asking the respondents to rank their GP on a numerical 5-point Likert scale. 
Categorizing performance like this has been one of the standard types of quality 
measurement (Donabedian, 1966) and widely used in satisfaction studies (Pascoe, 
1983). Numerical measurements are handled in the same way, as the traditionally 
Likert scale ranged from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Ranging the satisfaction 
level in this way is an attempt to create an interval scale. Often, and also in this case, 
we cannot assume that the distance between each points is equal, thus it is not a true 
interval scale, but an ordinal scale. This type of measurement puts constraints on 
what types of statistical treatments we can apply (Meltzoff, 1997).  
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We need to consider whether our data is valid. More specifically “whether 
operationalization and the scoring of cases adequately reflect the concepts the researcher seeks 
to measure” (Adcock, 2001, p. 529). The website seeks to capture patients satisfaction 
with the GP service. The question is then if these measurements are adequate in 
describing satisfaction, or if there is something unobservable confounding the results 
(Sitzia, 1999). The content validity in this study is considered acceptable as the 
measured indicators are consistent with other similar research capturing satisfaction 
with GP service (Sitzia, 1999). The selected indicators for satisfaction are based on 
international websites and correspond closely to the three components Donabedian 
(1988) discusses of how to evaluate quality in health care.  We can also report relative 
consistency with the measurement variables and results from the satisfaction studies 
Lurås (2007) and Godager and Iversen (2010) from the Norwegian survey of living 
conditions.  
 
Whether our findings reflect actual differences in the population, is a question of 
external validity and generalizability. One of the most important criterias that must 
be fulfilled to be able to generalize our findings is to draw a representative sample 
with random sampling.  Our study sample is a self-selected sample across Norway. 
Because of this, the sample has not been stratified to reflect the composition of age 
and gender, and there might be bias in the sample such as unobserved 
socioeconomic status (Winter, 2000).  The study sample does not adequately 
resemble the population when we compare the information we have about 
observable characteristics to generalize across the population.  Figure one and two 
below reveal that young people below 20 and over 60 are clearly underrepresented. 
Also, the sample includes more women than men, while the majority of age is 
between 20 and 50 years old.  As a result our findings in this paper describe 
satisfaction for the users of Legelisten at this point. 
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Figure 1. Age and gender for the study sample (N=14 225)  
 
Figure 2. Age and gender for the population obtained from SSB 2012 (N=4 985 870) 
 
2.1.2 Data limitations 
The sample is not a result of a well thought sampling strategy, thus is under the risk 
of certain pitfalls of self-selection such as overrepresentation of groups of people 
with a certain opinion they wish to share regarding their GP. Additionally, people 
who had already learned about this website at the point of data extraction, and were 
inclined to submit an evaluation, may share something unobserved to us. Biased 
estimators will result if this unobservable heterogeneity is correlated with the 
explanatory variables in the regression models. Regarding completeness of the 
dataset, there is a high number of missing values since age and gender are not 
mandatory to answer. In addition, the number of responses differs between the 
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dependent variables since it is only mandatory to answer the rating describing 
overall satisfaction.  Data was retrieved when the site had been up and running for 
less than a year. There is a chance it suffered from currently immature guidelines for 
how to evaluate, and how to handle the evaluations. Only published evaluations are 
used in this thesis as these have obliged the rules for evaluation. This is done 
considering the quality of the data, but it may generate bias in aggregated 
satisfaction. The non-published evaluations have a higher proportion of dissatisfied 
patients than the included sample. 
2.1.3 Variables 
Table 1. Definition of the variables 
Variables	   Description	  
Dependent	  variables	   	  Overall	   How	   satisfied	   the	   responder	   is	   summarized	  over	   all	   dimensions	  from	  1	  to	  5	  Booking	   How	  satisfied	  the	  responder	  is	  with	  time	  it	  takes	  from	  contact	  to	  the	  consult	  takes	  place	  from	  1	  to	  5	  Waiting	   How	   satisfied	   the	   responder	   is	  with	  waiting	   time	   in	   the	  waiting	  room	  from	  1	  to	  5	  Consultation	   How	   satisfied	   the	   responder	   is	  with	  whether	   the	  GP	   gives	   them	  sufficient	  time	  in	  the	  consult	  from	  1	  to	  5	  Listening	   How	  satisfied	  the	  responder	  is	  with	  the	  GP	  listening	  skills	  from	  1	  to	  5	  Insight	   How	   satisfied	   the	   responder	   is	   with	   the	   GPs	   effort	   to	   provide	  them	  with	  insight	  of	  own	  health	  and	  treatment	  from	  1	  to	  5	  Advice	   How	   satisfied	   the	   responder	   is	   with	   GPs	   ability	   to	   provide	  trustworthy	  advice	  and	  recommendations	  from	  1	  to	  5	  
Independent	  variables	   	   	  Patient	  shortage	   Coded	   1	   when	   available	   list	   spots>100,	   coded	   0	   otherwise	  denoted	  as	  full	  list	  Herfindahl-­‐Hircman	  index	  	  (HHI)	   Measures	  level	  of	  GP	  competition	  within	  10	  km	  radius.	  Sum	  of	  the	  squares	   of	   market	   share	   range	   between	   0	   and	   1	   where	  1=monopoly	  Log	  Herfindahl	  (log	  HHI)	   Log	  of	  HHI	  ranging	  from	  approximately	  -­‐6	  to	  0	  	  GP	  female	   Coded	  1	  if	  GP	  is	  female,	  0	  for	  male	  
GP	  age	   Continuous	   variable	   categorized	   into	   dummy	   variables	   for	   age	  groups,	  41-­‐50,	  51-­‐60	  and	  over	  60.	  40	  or	  younger	  are	  omitted	  as	  reference	  group	  Patient	  female	   Coded	  1	  if	  patient	  is	  female,	  0	  for	  male	  Patient	  age	   Dummy	  variables	  for	  age	  groups	  31-­‐40,	  41-­‐50,	  51-­‐60,	  over	  60.	  	  30	  or	  younger	  are	  omitted	  as	  reference	  group	  County	   Dummy	  variables	  for	  counties	  
Multilevel	  Clusters	   	   	  GP	   Individual	  GP	  identification	  Zip	  	   Zip	  code	  of	  the	  GP	  practice	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2.2 Method 
This study investigates the relationship between patient satisfaction and patient 
shortage, controlled for influence of competition, GP and patient characteristics. The 
association will be investigated with descriptive statistics and multilevel ordered 
logistic regression analysis. The analysis is conducted with Stata version 12 and Excel 
version 2011 software tools. 
2.2.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics is presented with figures and tables in order to demonstrate the 
immediate relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Mean 
differences will be tested for significance by Wilcoxon rank sum test. The Wilcoxon 
rank sum test is the non-parametric alternative to the two-sample t-test used when 
we cannot assume normal distribution in the bivariate sample. The test is therefore 
suitable for a logistic distribution where the only assumptions are independent 
random sample and that the distribution between the bivariate is equal.  The test 
estimates whether the ranked difference in means are statistically significantly 
different from zero.  It is less sensitive to outliers and more robust in estimating the 
significance level, compared to the t-test (Newbold, Carlson, & Thorne, 2013). 
2.2.2 Multilevel ordinal logistic regression 
The data consists of dependent variables, of ordered categories from one to five 
where five is the highest score. The cut points between these categories are known, 
but assumptions of a certain interval between the categories would be arbitrary since 
the difference between category 3 and 4 can be different from 4 and 5 (McCullagh, 
1980). Categorical variables violate the assumptions for ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression, therefore applying an ordinal logistic regression model estimated by 
means of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is suitable. Then we avoid 
restrictive assumptions about linearity and distance between the ordered categories. 
The MLE method calculates the coefficient estimates that maximize the probability of 
an outcome that is suitable for the observed data (Long & Freese, 2006; McCullagh, 
1980; McKelvey & Zavoina, 1975).  A drawback of the MLE approach is that the 
estimated coefficients is not as easily interpretable as with coefficients estimated with 
OLS (Long & Freese, 2006).  
 
We model the ordinal responses with a latent variable model. The ordinal regression 
can be derived by assuming an unobservable latent continuous response variable 
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underneath the categories. It follows a cumulative logistic distribution F with an 
assumed variance 𝜖 = 𝜋2/3.  The categories are then transformed into a set of 
dichotomies, which represents a series of thresholds values upon the latent variable 
ranging from 𝛾0=−∞,  and 𝛾 j=∞. The thresholds are further used to estimate the 
cumulative probabilities of a respondent replying one of the categories s (Hedeker & 
Gibbons, 1994; Long, 1997). The ordinal model can be defined by linking the 
cumulative probability Pr(yi≤ 𝛼s) to the linear predictor (McCullagh, 1980; Skrondal 
& Rabe-Hesketh, 2004,p.29)                               𝑔[Pr(yi≤ 𝛼s)]=ks−𝜈I,  s=1,…,s-1,                   (3) 
where 𝛼 1< 𝛼 2< ⋯ < 𝛼 s are ordered response categories, Pr(yi≤ 𝛼 s)=1 and ks are 
unknown thresholds parameters, 𝑘1< 𝑘2<...𝑘s−1, which do not vary between the 
units. The probability of a particular response ys becomes    
  Pr(yi=𝛼s)= Pr(yi≤ 𝛼s)−Pr(yi≤ 𝛼s−1).      (4) 
2.2.2.1 Three level structure 
We wish to avoid restrictive assumptions of conducting a singular level analysis, 
which ignores the fact that the individual responses are not independent of each 
other as some of the GPs have many ratings and a proportion of the GPs have higher 
rating than others. The respondents are clustered together by the GP, and their 
market area clusters the GPs, as GPs in the same area are more likely to share the 
same practice style. Therefore a less restrictive multilevel model, where correlated 
error terms within levels are assumed, is preferable. Multiple level modeling has 
been conducted in other studies (Godager et al., 2012; Godager, Iversen, & Ma, 2009; 
Iversen & Lurås, 2002). In the recent years, it has become more common to include 
multiple levels in the models as the development of proper tools has advanced. 
Groupings or clusters of responses can produce more valid results rather than just 
accounting for level one individual response (Goldstein, 2011). Respondents 
belonging to the same clusters, share cluster-specific influences, thus they are 
correlated. This is accounted for by including GPs and zip code as level two and 
three in the analysis. Then we are able to explain more of the unobserved 
heterogeneity influencing the responses. However, it is not realistic to observe or 
include all possible relevant cluster specific covariates in the analysis. As a result we 
can expect there to be unobserved heterogeneity not only between clusters, but also 
within the cluster levels after conditioning on the covariates. Therefore we model 
random effects that are allowed to have different variance between levels. A model 
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can include random intercept, coefficients, or both. For our purpose we will include 
random intercepts, which represent unobserved heterogeneity in the overall 
response (Skrondal & Rabe-Hesketh, 2004). The model can be specified as: 
y*ijk= 𝛽2𝑥2ijk+⋯+ 𝛽n𝑥nk+  𝛿jk(2)+  𝛿k(3)+𝜖ijk      (5) 
where y*ijk is the latent unobserved continuous response variable, which is related to 
the observed ordinal variable yijk via the threshold model described above. 𝜒ijk is a 
covariate with fixed regression coefficients 𝛽, 𝛿jk(2) and 𝛿k(3)  are random intercepts at 
level two and three respectively, and 𝜖ijk is the unobserved variance following a 
logistic distribution, independently of 𝑥ijk , 𝛿jk(2), and 𝛿k(3) (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 
2012). 
2.2.2.2 Assumptions 
Logistic regressions require assessing some underlying assumptions. When 
assumptions are not met in logistic regression, we risk reporting biased and unstable 
coefficients and standard errors, which in turn can lead to invalid statistical 
inferences (Midi, Sarkar, & Rana, 2010). Logistic regression does not require the 
assumptions of OLS such as normal distribution of error terms, linearity and 
homoscedasticity due to the non-linear transformation of the outcome (O`Connell, 
2006).  
 
The main assumption for using ordinal logistic regression is the proportional odds 
assumption. This assumption states that slopes between categories must be constant, 
which means the odds of being in a higher category must be stable (O`Connell, 2006).  
The proportional odds assumption is testable in Stata with the brant test. Our models 
did not fulfill the assumption, which could be expected as our models consist of a 
large sample size, many explanatory variables and one of the independent variables 
is continuous.  The violation indicates that some of the variables contain odds 
between categories that are significantly different from each other (O`Connell, 2006). 
However proportional odds tests are very sensitive, often violated and should be 
interpreted with caution (Allison, 1999). One possible solution is to relax the alpha 
level. Another solution is to use a different analysis, but the key approach is to 
identify which of the variables that is responsible for the violation, and then 
investigate the magnitude of the inconsistent slopes (O`Connell, 2006). The gender 
variables and a couple of the age groups were the source of violation in the models. 
Since the direction of the slope was constant between categories, and these variables 
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serve merely as controlling variables in the models, the violation of the assumption 
did not generate great concern. In addition, it has been recommended to evaluate 
variation in effects with a binary outcome, which is included in the appendix (Brant, 
1990; O`Connell, 2006). Additional assumptions exist for logistic regression described 
by Aldrich and Nelson (1984). Logistic regression assumes linearity between the 
independent variable and the logit, which cannot be assessed directly in ordinal 
models. If the assumption is incorrect, we risk understating the association. Next it is 
important to handle binary and ordinary outcomes properly. Collapsing an ordinal 
outcome into a binary involves loosing a lot of information and risk bias in the 
results. Although it might be tempting to simplify the analysis by collapsing the 
categories, we have kept our five-category outcome, but presents a binary alternative 
in the appendix. Further, the observations in the dependent variable are assumed to 
be independent of one another, and consist of a random sample of units (Aldrich & 
Nelson, 1984). Although the responses are independent of each other considering this 
is not a panel or a matched pair study, we may assume there to be some correlation 
between the responders who share the same GP and GPs within the same 
geographical areas, which led us to clustering in the model. It is also normal to 
assume absence of multicollinearity which occurs if there is a strong linear 
relationship between the independent variables (Aldrich & Nelson, 1984). Midi et al. 
(2010) explain multicollinearity as a  “monster” in regression analysis that is 
challenging to tame. The best way to avoid it is by fitting the model with caution by 
stepwise selection, but even then the presence of multicollinearity may corrupt the 
process. The model as a whole may still serve as a good explanation of the variation 
in the response variable, thus it is the individual prediction that may become 
unstable with inflated standard errors. Simple diagnostics were performed such as 
correlation matrix where none of the correlations exceeded 0.8, and checking the 
variance inflation factor (VIF). Logistic regression is a less powerful analysis than 
OLS, thus the VIF value should not exceed 2.5. A few VIF values exceeded this 
threshold, although the mean VIF is 1.76. If possible one should drop some of these 
variables, centering the mean, create interaction variables or possibly the best 
solution, to be aware of its presence and its consequences. The latter will be the 
approach in this analysis. When we have a large sample size with sufficient 
observation for each case, multicollinearity is not a major problem (Midi et al., 2010).  
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2.2.3 The empirical model 
“While measures of fit provide some information, it is only partial information that must be 
assessed within the context of the theory motivating the analysis, past research, and the 
estimated parameters of the model being considered (Long, 1997, p. 102).  
Model fitting was mainly conducted by including variables based on the theoretical 
and empirical reasoning presented in chapter one, and using the likelihood ratio test, 
which has been argued to be the most reliable for assessing independent variables’ 
contribution to a model (O`Connell, 2006). The main explanatory variable patient 
shortage along with the covariates log herfindahl age and gender of both patients and 
GPs were included based on the study objective and previous research. Patient 
shortage proved to be a strong and stable effect in the pre analysis. Next, the dummy 
variables for counties were tested for relevant inclusion based on a possible argument 
that there is an individual difference that influences satisfaction reflected in the 
choice of residency in rural or city areas. The inclusion of county had a major 
influence by reducing the initial effect of log HHI on satisfaction. We concluded based 
on the log-likelihood ratio test that inclusion of counties had a significant effect 
different from zero and contributed to variance in the regression models: overall, 
booking, and waiting. Regression models for consultation, advice, listening and insight 
resulted in an insignificant contribution. However, county is still included in the 
models as the influence, although not as strong, on log HHI remained. Likelihood 
ratio tests were also conducted for inclusion of the third level random effect, zip. Zip 
tested to provide a significant contribution to the variance in all regressions at 1 and 
5% level with exception for consultation and advice. Zip is included in these models as 
well as it still proves to capture some unobserved variance and to uphold consistency 
with the other models.  
 
The specific model analyzing the relationship between the dependent satisfaction 
variables overall, booking, waiting, consultation, listening, insight, advice, and 
explanatory variables is expressed below.  
y*ijk=  𝛽1Patientshortageijk+  𝛽2LogHerfindahlijk+  𝛽3GPfemaleijk+  𝛽4GPageijk+  𝛽5Patientfe
maleijk+  𝛽6Patientageijk+  𝛽7Countyijk+  𝛿jk(2)+𝛿k(3)+  𝜀ijk 
The multilevel ordered logistic regression models are conducted using a user written 
Stata program, General Linear Latent Mixed Models approach (GLLAMM). This 
program can estimate regression analysis based on the common type of dependent 
variables, including ordered categories (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2003b). 
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3 Results 
3.1 Descriptive presentation 
This part presents descriptive statistics of the general distribution of the dependent 
variables before restrictions on the sample are imposed. Followingly we check 
whether there is bias present in the composition of GPs and patients demographics 
within the grouping of the main explanatory variable patient shortage. Lastly we look 
into differences in means on the dependent variables by patient shortage and conduct 
a significance test.  
 
Responders’ ratings on the website Legelisten seem to follow the same pattern 
documented in earlier research. It is common to find that people are very satisfied 
with their GP on a general level (Williams et al., 1998).  
 
Figure 3. Distribution of satisfaction on the dependent variables 
 
Figure 3 shows that the responders are very satisfied with their GP and the main 
proportion has rated their GP at the highest category 5. The dependent variable 
overall, and the variables describing the interpersonal relationship; advice, listening, 
insight and consultation have been rated at the highest category by approximately 70% 
of the responders. High satisfaction with interpersonal relationship has been 
described as being important in the literature (Baker, 1990; McGlone et al., 2002). 
Booking and waiting stand out with a larger variance between response categories, 
0.0	  %	  10.0	  %	  
20.0	  %	  30.0	  %	  
40.0	  %	  50.0	  %	  
60.0	  %	  70.0	  %	  
80.0	  %	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
Overall	  Advice	  Listening	  Insight	  Consultation	  Booking	  Waiting	  
	   27	  
and a much lower proportion, under 30% is very satisfied. This figure reveals that 
the current sample rates their GP in the same pattern as reported in previous studies, 
high satisfaction overall and with dimension describing the interpersonal 
relationship, and lower and wider spread on waiting times (Godager & Iversen, 
2014). This is an important observation since the sample is of an unconventional type 
in the Norwegian context previously predicted to generate mostly negative 
responses (Danielsen, Kjøllesdal, & Bjertnæs, 2013).  
 
Earlier research has reported varying results regarding whether satisfaction is 
dependent on demographics such as age and gender (Carr-Hill, 1992). Sivertsen 
(2014) has analyzed the difference in satisfaction dependent on demographics based 
on the current dataset. Satisfaction increase with patient age, and male patients are 
more satisfied than female patients with booking and waiting. Responders are also 
more satisfied if the GP is male, and if the GP is of younger age. Since demographics 
seem to influence satisfaction, we present the composition of GPs and patient 
characteristics between the GPs with patient shortage and full list. This is done in 
Figure 4 and 5 below in order to investigate whether there are any demographic 
biases that could influence the satisfaction levels between the groups.  
 
Figure 4. GP demographics between patient shortage and full list 
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Figure 5. Patient demographics between patient shortage and full list 
 
Figure 4 shows that it is a larger proportion of male GPs with patient shortage and a 
slightly larger proportion of patient shortage among the youngest and oldest GPs.  
Figure 5 shows the patient demographics. There are no noteworthy differences in the 
composition of patient demographics between patient shortage and full list except that 
males are slightly underrepresented in the full list group compared to the patient 
shortage group.  
 
Table 2 presented below shows whether there is a difference in mean satisfaction on 
the dependent variables between patient shortage and full list. It shows that the mean 
satisfaction is in accordance with previous literature where satisfaction is found to be 
lower on dimensions describing the interpersonal relationship and higher on waiting 
times, when the GP has patient shortage (Godager & Iversen, 2014; Lurås, 2007). 
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Table 2. Mean satisfactions divided by patient shortage and full list 
	  
Patient	  Shortage	   Full	  list	   	  
Variable	   N	   Mean	   SE	   N	   Mean	   SE	   Prob>|z|	  
Overall	   2042	   3.939	   1.529	   15924	   4.195	   1.366	   0.0000	  
Booking	   1554	   3.377	   1.313	   12639	   3.177	   1.373	   0.0000	  
Waiting	   1560	   3.428	   1.199	   12717	   3.335	   1.15	   0.0008	  
Consultation	   1637	   4.078	   1.379	   13195	   4.196	   1.279	   0.0109	  
Advice	   1645	   4.122	   1.306	   13248	   4.319	   1.169	   0.0000	  
Listening	   1649	   4.028	   1.446	   13269	   4.286	   1.284	   0.0000	  
Insight	   1624	   3.988	   1.423	   13120	   4.194	   1.293	   0.0000	  	  
Table 2 shows the mean and standard error of satisfaction on the dependent 
variables between responders rating a GP with patient shortage, and full list. We can 
see that mean satisfaction is lower for the patient shortage group on overall, 
consultation, advice, listening and insight. On the other hand, the mean satisfaction is 
higher for the same group on booking and waiting. Patient shortage and full list tested 
to be significantly different from each other at a 1% significant level on all dependent 
variables with the non- parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test (Mann Whitney).  
3.2 Regression analysis 
Below are three tables presented with regression results for the models with the 
dependent variables: overall, advice, listening, insight consultation, booking and waiting 
estimated from the following model; Multilevel ordered logistic regression  
y*ijk=  𝛽1Patientshortageijk+  𝛽2Logherfindahlijk+  𝛽3GPfemaleijk+  𝛽4GPageijk+  𝛽5Patientfe
maleijk+  𝛽6Patientageijk+  𝛽7Countyijk+  𝛿jk(2)+𝛿k(3)+  𝜀ijk 
The primary emphasis for these regressions is to estimate the possible influence of 
patient shortage on the dependent satisfaction variables, conditioned by the covariates. 
In general, the regression results support the findings in the descriptive analysis.  All 
of the models have estimated associations between patient shortage and patient 
satisfaction as predicted in the hypothesis. These results are aligned with previous 
literature, which is discussed in more detail in the discussion section. 
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Table 3. Multilevel ordered logistic regression for overall  
Significant	  different	  from	  zero	  at	  **1%	  level	  and	  *5%	  level.	  ±  non	  are	  significant	  at	  a	  5%	  level.	  	  
 
Results from model 1 support the findings from the descriptive analysis.  We see that 
patient shortage has a negative association with overall. Patients enlisted with a GP 
facing patient shortage have lower odds of 0.596 for high satisfaction compared to full 
list, when all other covariates are held constant. Further we see that both GP and 
patient characteristics influence the satisfaction level. The odds for high satisfaction 
are 0.816 lower for GP female compered to GP male. Also, higher GP age has a negative 
association with satisfaction levels compared to GPs who are 40 or younger.  Among 
the patient characteristics, only the patient age groups have a significant influence on 
satisfaction levels. The odds of high satisfaction increase with higher age compared 
to those who are 30 or younger. A higher log Herfindahl indicates a higher market 
concentration, which proxies less competition. After the inclusion of the county 
dummies, satisfaction overall is not significantly associated with competition level. 
Model	  1:	  Overall	  
Predictors	   exp	  (b)	   95%	  Confidence	  interval	  
Patient	  shortage	   0.596**	   (0.489,	  0.728)	  
Log	  herfindahl	   1.008	   (0.941,	  1.079)	  
GP	  Female	   0.816**	   (0.713,	  0.935)	  
GP	  age	  41-­‐50	   0.743**	   (0.619,	  0.892)	  
GP	  age	  51-­‐60	   0.595**	   (0.501,	  0.708)	  
GP	  age	  60+	   0.524**	   (0.429,	  0.642)	  
Patient	  Female	   1.041	   (0.942,	  1.149)	  
Patient	  age	  31-­‐40	   1.288**	   (1.138,	  1.457)	  
Patient	  age	  41-­‐50	   1.555**	   (1.360,	  1.778)	  
Patient	  age	  51-­‐60	   1.993**	   (1.695,	  2.344)	  
Patient	  age	  60+	   2.352**	   (1.950,	  2.837)	  
County	  dummies	  ±	   Yes	   (0.851,	  1.670)	  
K1	   -­‐3.116**	   (-­‐3.507,	  -­‐2.725)	  
K2	   -­‐2.405**	   (-­‐2.793,	  -­‐2.018)	  
K3	   -­‐1.971**	   (-­‐2.357,	  -­‐1.586)	  
K4	   -­‐1.261**	   (-­‐1.644,	  -­‐0,877)	  
Random	  Effect	   Variance	   Standard	  error	  𝜹jk(2)	  GP	   1.1089	   0.945	  𝜹k(3)	  Zip	   0.0743	   0.0386	  
Log	  Likelihood	   -­‐10559	   -­‐	  
NO	  Response	   11262	   -­‐	  NO	  GPs	   3250	   -­‐	  NO	  Zip	   893	   -­‐	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The estimated threshold values k1, k2, k3 and k4 are shown at the bottom of the fixed 
effect part of the table. These thresholds mark the cut point where it is predicted to 
rate the GP in a higher category, and is normally not given an individual 
interpretation (O`Connell, 2006).  Further we have estimated two random intercepts. 
The variance between GPs is 1.108 and the variance between zip codes is .074. These 
random intercepts show how much heterogeneity there is between the individual 
GPs and zip code in model 1, conditioned by the fixed covariates.  
 
Table 4. Multilevel ordered logistic regression for time use 
	  
Model	  2:Booking	  	   	   Model	  3:	  Waiting	  	   Model4:	  Consultation	  	  
Predictors	   exp	  (b)	   95%	  CI	   	   exp	  (b)	   95%	  CI	   exp(b)	   95%	  CI	  
Patient	  Shortage	   1.389**	   (1.180,	  1.635)	   	   1.209*	   (0.996,	  1.468)	   0.752**	   (0.620,	  0.911)	  
Log	  herfindahl	   0.922**	   (0.869,	  0.979)	   	   0.945	   (0.883,	  1.013)	   1.033	   (0.969,	  1.101)	  
GP	  female	   0.703**	   (0.633,	  0.781)	   	   0.766**	   (0.677,	  0.867)	   0.844**	   (0.743,	  0.959)	  
GP	  41-­‐50	   0.897	   (0.782,	  1.030)	   	   0.793**	   (0.673,	  0.934)	   0.773**	   (0.651,	  0.917)	  
GP	  51-­‐60	   0.886	   (0.777,	  1.012)	   	   0.603**	   (0.516,	  0.705)	   0.622**	   (0.529,	  0.731)	  
GP	  60+	   0.860	   (0.734,	  1.006)	   	   0.575**	   (0.477,	  0.963)	   0.641**	   (0.529,	  0.776)	  
Patient	  female	   0.873**	   (0.806,	  0.944)	   	   0.835**	   (0.769,	  0.907)	   1.129**	   (1.028,	  1.239)	  
P	  31-­‐40	   1.102	   (0.995,	  1.220)	   	   1.052	   (0.946,	  1.169)	   1.242**	   (1.104,	  1.398)	  
P	  41-­‐50	   1.077	   (0.966,	  1.201)	   	   1.220**	   (1.089,	  1.366)	   1.546**	   (1.359,	  1.758)	  
P	  51-­‐60	   0.958	   (0.846,	  1.085)	   	   1.485**	   (1.303,	  1.692)	   1.559**	   (1.342,	  1.810)	  
P	  60+	   0.981	   (0.852,	  1.131)	   	   1.677**	   (1.444,	  1.947)	   2.153**	   (1.805,	  2.659)	  
County±	   yes	   -­‐	   	   yes	   -­‐	   yes	   -­‐	  
k1	   -­‐2.339**	   (-­‐2.675,	  -­‐2.004)	   	   -­‐3.276**	   (-­‐3.66,	  -­‐2.886)	   -­‐3.362**	   (-­‐3.735,	  -­‐2.989)	  
k2	   -­‐1.163**	   (-­‐1.495,	  -­‐0.831)	   	   -­‐1.525**	   (-­‐1.906,	  -­‐1.143)	   -­‐2.659*	   (-­‐3.028,	  -­‐2.290)	  
k3	   -­‐1.163	   (-­‐0.157,	  0.505)	   	   0.118	   (-­‐0.262,	  0.498)	   -­‐2.039**	   (-­‐2.406,	  -­‐1.673)	  
k4	   1.053**	   (0.721,	  1.385)	   	   1.991**	   (1.609,	  2.373)	   -­‐1.099**	   (-­‐1.463,	  -­‐0.753)	  
Random	  Effect	   Variance	   Standard	  error	   	   Variance	   Standard	  error	   Variance	   Standard	  error	  𝛿jk(2)	  GPs	   0.530	   	  .0544	   	   1.135	   	  .0787	   0.996	   	  .083	  𝛿k(3)	  Zip	   0.236	   	  .038	   	   0.292	   	  .052	   0.047	   	  .033	  
Log	  Likelihood	   -­‐16132	   -­‐	   	   -­‐	  15053	   -­‐	   -­‐11402	   -­‐	  
NO	  Response	   10494	   -­‐	   	   10556	   -­‐	   10877	   -­‐	  NO	  GPs	   3250	   -­‐	   	   3188	   -­‐	   3217	   -­‐	  NO	  Zip	   893	   -­‐	   	   886	   -­‐	   889	   -­‐	  Significant	  different	  from	  zero	  at	  **1%	  and	  *5%	  level.	  ±  non are significant at a 5% level. 
Table 4 shows the results from model 2, 3 and 4. From model 2 with booking as 
dependent variable, we see that patient shortage has a positive association with 
satisfaction levels with booking. The odds of high satisfaction when the patient is 
listed with a GP experiencing patient shortage are 1.389 times higher compared to full 
list, conditioned by the other covariates. We register a significant negative 
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association between log Herfindahl and satisfaction. The odds of high satisfaction 
when patients have a GP with patient shortage are 0.922 lower when log Herfindal 
increases by one percent. This indicates that as the market becomes less competitive, 
the patients are less likely to be satisfied with booking.  Regarding the GP 
characteristics, only the gender variable shows a significant influence where the odds 
of higher satisfaction are 0.703 lower for GP female compared to males. The same goes 
for patient characteristics, as the odds of satisfaction decrease for patient female 
compared to males. Further we have estimated two random intercepts. The between 
GP variance is .5302 and between zip variance is .236. These random intercepts show 
how much observed variation there is between the individual GPs and zip codes.  
 
From model 3 with waiting at the GPs office as the dependent variable, we can report 
a positive and significant association between patient shortage and satisfaction with 
waiting. The odds of high satisfaction are 1.209 higher when the GP faces patient 
shortage compared to those having a full list, conditioned by all other covariates. The 
effect of log HHI shows that satisfaction decrease as the market gets less competitive, 
but is not significant. The GP characteristics all show a negative association with 
satisfaction. The odds of high satisfaction are 0.766 lower when the GP is female and 
decrease with higher GP age groups compared to GPs who are under 40. The odds of 
high satisfaction are also lower for female patients compared to males and decrease by 
a significant rate from the patient age group 41-50 and up, compared to patients aged 
30 or younger. Further we have estimated two random intercepts. The variance 
between GPs is 1.135 and the variance between zip codes is .292. These random 
intercepts show how much observed variation there is between the individual GPs 
and zip codes. GP has the second largest variance in model 3 and Zip has the largest 
variance in models 2 and 3 out of all the estimated models. This can be interpreted to 
mean that unobserved heterogeneity on the market level is mostly relevant for 
models measuring satisfaction on dimension that the GP can influence.  
 
In Model 4 with consultation as dependent variable we see a negative and significant 
association between patient shortage and satisfaction with consultation. Even though 
consultation denotes time use, it has been shown to reflect the interpersonal 
relationship and therefore not a subject of influence by the GP (Lurås, 2007; Morrell 
et al., 1986).  When patients are enlisted with a GP facing patient shortage the odds of 
high satisfaction are 0.752 lower compared to full list, conditioned by all other 
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covariates. The effect of log HHI shows that the odds of being satisfied increase as the 
market get less competitive, but is not significant. Further, there is a negative 
association between the GP characteristics and satisfaction. The odds are 0.844 lower 
for GP female, and decrease with higher GP age compared to when GPs are 40 or 
younger. Patient characteristics have positive and significant associations with 
satisfaction.  The odds of high satisfaction are 1.29 higher for patient female compared 
to males and increase with higher patient age compared to patients 30 or younger. The 
variance between GPs is estimated to .996 and zip code is .047 at level two and three 
respectively. These random intercepts show how much observed variation there is 
between the GPs and zip. Zip is much lower in the consultation model compared to 
booking and waiting.   
 Table	  5.	  Multilevel	  ordered	  logistic	  regression	  results	  for	  interpersonal	  relationship	  	  
	  
Model	  5:	  Advice	  	   Model	  6:	  Listening	  	   Model	  7:	  Insight	  	  
Predictors	   exp	  (b)	   95%	  CI	   exp	  (b)	   95%	  CI	   exp	  (b)	   95%	  CI	  
Patient	  Shortage	   0.657**	   (0.548,	  0.789)	   0.565**	   (0.459,	  0.695)	   0.675**	   (0.562,	  0.811)	  
Log	  herfindahl	   1.002	   (0.943,	  1.066)	   1.023	   (0.952,	  1.099)	   1.025	   (0.963,	  1.091)	  
GP	  female	   0.862*	   (0.762,	  0.975)	   0.866*	   (0.752,	  0.988)	   0.868*	   (0.767,	  0.982)	  
GP	  41-­‐50	   0.839*	   (0.713,	  0.988)	   0.709**	   (0.587,	  0.858)	   0.813*	   (0.691,	  0.958)	  
GP	  51-­‐60	   0.723**	   (0.619,	  0.844)	   0.572**	   (0.477,	  0.685)	   0.678**	   (0.580,	  0.793)	  
GP	  60+	   0.707**	   (0.587,	  0.850)	   0.508**	   (0.412,	  0.628)	   0.657**	   (0.546,	  0.790)	  
Patient	  female	   1.035	   (0.941,	  1.139)	   1.051	   (0.948,	  1.164)	   1.005	   (0.916,	  1.103)	  
P	  31-­‐40	   1.114	   (0.988,	  1.354)	   1.168*	   (1.028,	  1.326)	   1.135*	   (1.010,	  1.275)	  
P	  41-­‐50	   1.432**	   (1.257,	  1.630)	   1.594**	   (1.385,	  1.835)	   1.444**	   (1.272,	  1.639)	  
P	  51-­‐60	   1.498**	   (1.287,	  1.743)	   1.779**	   (1.507,	  2.100)	   1.597**	   (1.376,	  1.854)	  
P	  60+	   2.153**	   (1.794,	  2.584)	   2.186**	   (1.800,	  2.654)	   2.197**	   (1.840,	  2.624)	  
County	  ±	   yes	   -­‐	   yes	   -­‐	   yes	   -­‐	  
k1	   -­‐3.518**	   (-­‐3.878,	  -­‐3.158)	   -­‐3.474**	   (-­‐3.889,	  -­‐3.058)	   -­‐3.147**	   (-­‐3.505,	  -­‐.2.789)	  
k2	   -­‐2.670**	   (-­‐3.023,	  -­‐2.317)	   -­‐2.781**	   (-­‐3.192,	  -­‐2.370)	   -­‐2.388**	   (-­‐2.741,	  -­‐2.034)	  
k3	   -­‐2.013**	   (-­‐2.362,	  -­‐1.663)	   -­‐2.255**	   (-­‐2.663,	  -­‐1.846)	   -­‐1.860**	   (-­‐2.211,	  -­‐1.508)	  
k4	   -­‐1.010**	   (-­‐1.357,	  -­‐0.663)	   -­‐1.538**	   (-­‐1.944,	  -­‐1.131)	   -­‐0.912**	   (-­‐1.261,	  -­‐0.563)	  
Random	  Effect	   Variance	   Standard	  error	   Variance	   Standard	  error	   Variance	   Standard	  error	  𝛿jk(2)	  GP	   0.782	   0.074	   1.187	   0.102	   0.849	   0.075	  𝛿k(3)	  Zip	   0.039	   0.029	   0.096	   0.044	   0.055	   0.030	  
Log	  Likelihood	   -­‐10634	   -­‐	   -­‐11424	   -­‐	   -­‐9983	   -­‐	  
NO	  Response	   10904	   -­‐	   10912	   -­‐	   10831	   -­‐	  NO	  GPs	   3217	   -­‐	   3220	   -­‐	   3214	   -­‐	  NO	  Zips	   890	   -­‐	   891	   -­‐	   891	   -­‐	  Significant	  different	  from	  zero	  at	  **1%	  level	  and	  *5%level.	  ±  non	  are	  significant	  at	  a	  5%	  level.	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Table 5 shows the results from model 5, 6 and 7. Model 5 with advice as dependent 
variable shows a negative and significant association between patient shortage and 
satisfaction with advice. The odds of high satisfaction are 0.657 times lower when 
patients are enlisted with a GP facing patient shortage compared to full list, 
conditioned by all other covariates. All GP characteristics show a negative and 
significant association with satisfaction. The odds of high satisfaction are 0.862 lower 
for patient female, and decrease with higher GP age compared to when the GP is 40 or 
younger. The odds of high satisfaction significantly increase with higher patient age 
from the age group 41-50 and up. The estimated variance at the second level for GPs 
is 0.782, and 0.039 for zip at the third level.  In this model, the third level inclusion 
was not significant. However it still explains some unobserved heterogeneity and is 
included in the model1.   
 
Model 6 shows a negative and significant association between patient shortage and 
satisfaction with the GPs listening skills. The odds of high satisfaction are 0.565 lower 
when patients are enlisted with a GP facing patient shortage compared to patients 
with a GP with a full list, conditioned by all other covariates. The effect of log HHi 
shows that the odds of being satisfied increase as the market gets less competitive, 
but is not significant. The GP characteristics have a negative association with 
satisfaction. The odds of high satisfaction are lower when the rated GP is female, and 
decrease with GP age compared to GPs 40 or younger. Patient age has a positive 
association with satisfaction and increases as the patient is older compared to 
patients who are 30 or younger. The estimated variance at the second level between 
GPs is 1.187, which is the largest value between all the models, and 0.096 for zip at 
the third level.   
  
Model 7 shows a negative and significant association between patient shortage and 
satisfaction with GPs contribution to insight. The odds of high satisfaction are 0.675 
lower when patients are enlisted with a GP who faces patient shortage compared to 
full list, conditioned by all other variables. The effect of log HHI is not significant. All 
GP characteristics have a negative association with satisfaction. The odds of high 
satisfaction are lower for female GPs and with increasing GP age, compared to GPs 
who are 40 or younger. Patient age has a positive significant association where 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  results	  are	  not	  sensitive	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  random	  effect	  at	  the	  third	  level	  is	  included.	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satisfaction increase as the patient is older, compared to patients who are 30 or 
younger. The variance between GPs is estimated to 0.849 and the variance between 
zip is 0.055.  
  
In order to check for robustness it is conducted binary analysis for the seven ordinal 
models for comparison presented in the appendix. The dependent variables are 
coded 1 if the rating=5, and 0 otherwise, hence we have a strict dichotomizing.  
Comparing the two different models for overall, we see very small differences in the 
odds ratios. The main predictor patient shortage, has a significant and slightly weaker 
effect in the binary regression (0.613) than in the ordinal regression (0.596) on overall.  
A similar tendency is true for all the variables describing the interpersonal 
relationship between the GP and the patient. There is a larger difference between the 
models for booking and waiting. In the binary analysis, the odds ratio for being 
satisfied with waiting when the GP has patient shortage is higher in the binary (1.405) 
than in the ordinal analysis (1.209). The odds for being satisfied with booking are 
lower and not significant in the binary analysis. The probable reason for this 
deviance is that this category had a much larger spread over the response categories 
compared to the variables describing the interpersonal relationship. Overall the 
binary models confirm the effects from the ordinal model, which provides us with 
evidence that the analyses are strong and robust. The effects from model 2, booking 
should be interpreted with caution.  
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4 Discussion and Conclusion 
This section discusses the main findings in light of previous literature and points to 
limitations and strengths of this analysis. It also discusses possible further research 
and implications that can be inferred from the results. A concluding remark is drawn 
at the end. 
4.1 Main findings  
The main objective for this study is to investigate the relationship between patient 
satisfaction with the GP and patient shortage. To analyze this association we have 
conducted a multilevel ordinal regression where the main outcome is the odds ratio 
of a response in a higher category of satisfaction when the GP has patient shortage.  
Two hypotheses were stated to address the objective. The results in this study 
support the first hypothesis that Patient shortage is associated with lower rated 
satisfaction with the GP dimensions that describe the interpersonal relationship 
between the patient and GP. We have seen from both the descriptive and regression 
analysis that overall satisfaction, which captures a summarized rating including all 
the aspects of the GP practice, is lower for patients rating a GP who has patient 
shortage compared to the GPs with a full list. This finding has shown to be robust, as 
it has persisted with a strong effect through every type of pre and main analysis. The 
responses have shown through the descriptive presentation and the regression 
analysis, lower odds for high satisfaction when the GP has patient shortage on four 
dimensions of the interpersonal relationship.  These are the GPs ability to give 
trustable advice, listen to what the patient have to say, communicate better insight of 
disease and treatment and the perception of being given sufficient time in the 
consultation. These four dimensions also correspond with overall, which indicates that 
these dimensions have the strongest influence on overall satisfaction. The results also 
support the second hypothesis that patient shortage is associated with higher rated 
satisfaction with the GPs waiting times, which may be influenced by the GP. Both 
descriptive and regression results confirm the association. Satisfaction with booking, 
the time from initial contact to when the consultation takes place is more likely to be 
high when the GP faces patient shortage. The same is true for satisfaction with waiting, 
the time spent in the waiting room.  
 
The association between patient satisfaction and patient shortage in the current study 
confirms and adds to previous empirical results. Several papers have based their 
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research on the Norwegian survey of living conditions. Lurås (2007) found that 
patients enlisted with a GP with patient shortage were less satisfied with the GPs 
interpersonal skills and with the consultation length. The same patients were on the 
other hand more satisfied with waiting time, although it did not seem to affect the 
overall satisfaction level. These results imply that it is the interpersonal dimensions 
that matter the most. This is confirmed by Iversen and Lurås (2011) who comment 
that the improvement on availability among GPs with patient shortage as observed 
in their study, does not seem to compensate for the dimensions considered as 
inferior. We can argue that this applies in the current study, as it seems that it is the 
interpersonal relationship that contributes to overall satisfaction, not shorter waiting 
times. Godager and Iversen (2010); (2014), have found similar results. Patients 
enlisted with a GP with patient shortage had lower satisfaction on the interpersonal 
relationship, and higher satisfaction with booking. Satisfaction with booking has 
shown to reflect the actual changes in booking times, which is interesting because it 
demonstrates how responsive the patients are to actual change.  
 
The current study has a wider range of variables describing the interpersonal 
relationship than those described above, which gives interpretation of the association 
more depth.  In addition, unlike the previous studies, this study has measurements 
on both booking and waiting, which in reality are two different types of waiting. A 
GP offering a shorter wait for consultation might not necessarily offer a short wait in 
the waiting room. Our results indicate that patient shortage induce a reduction on 
both. 
 
Satisfaction is a complex measure that can be influenced by other factors. We 
therefore included several covariates based on theory and empirical results in order 
to control for influence on the association of interest. Log Herfindahl measures market 
competition for GPs and seemed at first to influence higher satisfaction with lower 
competition levels, except for satisfaction with booking and waiting. However, this 
association diminished after the inclusion of county. This change in effect can be 
interpreted as that log HHI picked up something else in addition to competition, e.g. 
that patients living in the cities and rural areas have different expectations 
influencing satisfaction. The competition measure remained as a significant effect in 
the model for booking, where satisfaction is more likely to be lower as the market gets 
less competitive. Patient and GP age and gender were also included in the models. In 
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general they proved to affect satisfaction in the same manner as has been reported in 
earlier studies. Patient satisfaction increases with patient age, which is the most 
consistent demographic influence on satisfaction in the literature (Hall & Dornan, 
1990). Patient gender had a significant effect in three of the models. Males have 
higher odds of being satisfied with booking and waiting, while females have higher 
odds of being satisfied with the consultation. The literature has previously found 
mixed and contradictive results, (Pascoe, 1983; Williams & Calnan, 1991). The results 
of gender in this study might have been able to capture on what specific dimensions 
the difference lies.  The current study also finds that satisfaction is more likely to be 
lower when the GP ages, which is aligned with the findings by Gravelle et al. (2013). 
4.2 Limitations and strengths 
The covariates that were available and relevant for the objective of the study were 
included in the models. However, even though this allowed us to control for 
influence on satisfaction, there might be additional influencing characteristics we 
have not been able to control for. For instance, since the age categories for patients 
are ranged widely, it was problematic to include a matching variable consisting of 
age and gender for patient and GP. Godager (2012) suggests that when patient and 
GP resemble one another on observable characteristics, there is an increased 
possibility for higher satisfaction.  Such a relationship has been indicated for the 
applied data (Sivertsen, 2014). The results show that patients are less likely to be 
satisfied if the GP is female and if the GP is of an older age group. The problem with 
this pattern is that the majority of the older GPs are male. Further, there might be 
more unobservable heterogeneity that we have not been able to account for in this 
analysis. For example, self-declared health status, education, the continuity of the 
GP-patient relationship and the number of switches the GP experiences, could have 
provided some additional explanation. Including these variables and enabling for 
creating a matching variable could be relevant for further studies. 
 
 Another limitation is that although evidence suggests an association, we cannot 
draw inferences related to the causality of this relationship. There are also some 
limitations to the interpretation of models of the type used in this analysis. The 
estimated coefficients are not as intuitively interpretable as with OLS or binary 
logistic regressions, as the probability of change in one independent variable 
depends on the levels of all covariates in the model (Long & Freese, 2006). However 
the binary analysis in the appendix has demonstrated that our estimated odds ratios 
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are relatively robust, since most of the effects remained the same. There is one 
difference in the binary analysis that must be mentioned; patient shortage does not 
have a significant effect on satisfaction with booking. This might lead us to question 
how much we can rely on this estimate. The probable cause is the strict choice of 
cutoff point between the ordinal response categories to create a binary outcome and 
that satisfaction with booking has the widest distribution of all the dependent 
variables.  
 
 It is possible to conduct further post analysis on logistic and ordinal logistic 
regression. Such analysis has not been conducted for this study as the multilevel 
structure makes these analyses more complicated and less informative. On the other 
hand, the multilevel structure makes it possible to capture additional unobserved 
heterogeneity by clustering responders by GPs, which are further clustered by zip 
codes. We saw from the models that there is significant unobserved heterogeneity 
between the GPs that explains why some GPs have higher ratings than others. Also, 
for most of the regressions we find small unobserved variation between zip codes 
where GPs have their practice. The multilevel analysis shows that a part of the 
unobserved variance that influences the responses is at the level of GP and zip code. 
The advantage of analyzing with a multilevel model is that it is more conservative 
and therefore provides more robust coefficient estimates, standard errors and 
confidence intervals compared to single level modeling. Single level models ignore 
the possible effect of clustering and can therefore report over-simplistic and 
misleading results. By including these random effects we have reduced the chance of 
overstatement of statistical significance (Goldstein, 2011). 
4.3 Further research and policy implications 
It is common for studies to report findings that indicate that people in general are 
very satisfied with their GP (B. Williams et al., 1998). The current study confirms this 
tendency. Legelisten caused great concern among the physicians to begin with; that it 
would serve as a public pillory of GPs (Danielsen et al., 2013). Most of the ratings are 
positive. The fact that these results, obtained from a private rating site with self-
selected anonymous responders, have generated findings that are aligned with 
systematically collected data such as the Norwegian survey of living conditions, is 
interesting. First of all, this improves the reliability of the results regarding the 
association between patient satisfaction and whether they are enlisted with a GP who 
face patient shortage or full lists. Second, it offers confirmation of the validity of such 
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rating sites, whether the provided information captures what it is supposed to 
capture, and that the information is trustworthy. International studies have found an 
association between online rating sites, systematic surveys and clinical indicators 
(Bardach et al., 2013; Greaves et al., 2012). Their findings combined with the current 
results indicate that such rating sites might be useful for the public and that it is 
possible to trust the people, not just the experts, also when it comes to quality in 
healthcare (Surowiecki, 2004). This could be important for the public as the patients 
have imperfect information when they wish to choose a new GP because they have 
changed their address, or switch GP because they are unhappy with the current one. 
If there are conducted more studies regarding the association between patient 
satisfaction and clinical quality, it might contribute to involve the actual user of 
healthcare in planning and measuring quality to a larger extent.  There should be 
conducted further studies on these satisfaction ratings to monitor their development 
over time. It should be continually compared to the national survey, as has been 
done in this study, and with an inclusion of more covariates that might have an 
influence on satisfaction. This is in order to capture whether the similar satisfaction 
distribution continues, as more ratings will be published. Since we only included 
published ratings in this study, the general high satisfaction might decrease if the 
dissatisfied portion in the future complies to the qualitative rules of rating, as the 
website and its rules for submitting are more known. 
 
 A more recent service offered by Legelisten is the ability to sign up on a list to be 
alerted if a specific GP has an opening on the list. It could be interesting to see 
whether the size of these lists is higher for the GPs with above average satisfaction 
ratings. It could also be interesting to see whether GPs experienced a significant 
change in the switching activity after the rating site was established. These objectives 
could tell us how people take advantage of the website and whether they consider 
the ratings as useful information when choosing their GP, reducing the problem of 
imperfect information of GPs. The rating site also provides qualitative comments for 
each rating. Aharony and Strasser (1993) critique the lack of prioritizing the 
qualitative comments that are often included in the surveys. The contents of these 
comments could be analyzed to see how they relate to the quantitative ratings and 
can provide information that can improve the ethnographic perspective and give us 
more details on the negative experiences (Aharony & Strasser, 1993). It could further 
be interesting with a panel study on the development of the ratings of the individual 
	   41	  
GPs. For instance, if the GPs who initially have received poor ratings on certain 
dimensions, show improvement on those specific dimensions, this could suggest an 
acceptance of the ratings from the GPs point of view. It could also provide some 
implications on whether more published information could have the effect of 
increased quality, and point to what could serve as useful quality indicators.  
 
It can be suggested that patient shortage could be such a quality indicator. Iversen 
and Lurås (2002) argued with their results that only GPs, who are considered as 
inferior and experience patient shortage, are willing to reduce their waiting times. 
Iversen and Lurås (2011) further commented that patients might detect inferior 
physician quality, which is the reason why some GPs experience patient shortage. 
Patients enlisted with such a GP are 50% more likely to switch and this suggests that 
patient shortage might predict the level of switching the GP will experience. In 
addition, economic theory has implied that physicians of higher quality have a 
higher probability of being chosen by consumers as demand is affected by the 
perceived quality (Biørn & Godager, 2010). Satisfaction-studies have further 
provided evidence that patients are less satisfied with the GPs with patient shortage, 
except on waiting times (Godager & Iversen, 2010, 2014; Lurås, 2007), which the 
results in the current study support. If we accept patient satisfaction as a valid 
measure for quality in healthcare (Donabedian, 1988; Pascoe, 1983; Vuori, 1991), then 
the satisfaction-studies might imply that lower satisfaction with GPs with patient 
shortage, indicates that their service is of lower quality. Therefore patient shortage 
could be an indicator of physician quality. However, this suggestion needs to be 
investigated more carefully. A GP can have patient shortage without that being 
associated with lower quality. For instance, the GP can prefer a larger list size than 
what is actually possible if located in low-populated areas. The GPs have a 
possibility to influence whether they are referred to as having patient shortage 
because they set their preferred list size themselves.  
4.4 Conclusion 
The results in this analysis have shown strong effects, and are aligned with and 
contribute to previous literature based on a randomized sample. There is an 
association between lower patient satisfaction and patient shortage on dimensions 
describing the interpersonal relationship between the patient and the GP. On the 
other hand, it seems that GPs with patient shortage react by offering shorter waiting 
times, as satisfaction is more likely to be higher on those dimensions for the same 
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GPs. However, since it is the interpersonal relationship that corresponds with 
satisfaction overall, shorter waiting times does not seem to compensate for the 
perceived inferior quality. This might suggest that patient shortage can provide 
patients with additional information about the GP than merely vacancy.  
 
The results rely on data from a private GP rating site where responders are self-
selected and anonymous. This type of rating of healthcare-providers has been 
unconventional in the Norwegian context and the value of such a website has been 
questioned. Looking at the general distribution of satisfaction, we saw that the 
responders have rated their GPs in the same pattern known from previous 
systematic surveys. This might suggest that at least in the lack of something better, 
rating site does not produce systematically wrong judgments of quality and could be 
useful in alleviating the information problem patients face when choosing a GP.   
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6  Appendix 
Multilevel binary logistic regression for the dependent variables; overall, advice, 
listening, insight, consultation, booking and waiting are presented below. 
 
Table 6. Multilevel binary regression models for overall 
	  
	   Overall	  
Predictors	   	   exp	  (b)	   95%	  Confidence	  Interval	  
Patient	  shortage	   	   0.613**	   (0.499,	  0.754)	  
Log	  herfindahl	   	   0.994	   (0.925,	  1.067)	  
GP	  Female	   	   0.828**	   (0.720,	  0.952)	  
GP	  age	  41-­‐50	   	   0.764**	   (0.634,	  0.921)	  
GP	  age	  51-­‐60	   	   0.592**	   (0.496,	  0.708)	  
GP	  age	  60+	   	   0.523**	   (0.425,	  0.644)	  
Patient	  Female	   	   1.086	   (0.979,	  1.204)	  
Patient	  age	  31-­‐40	   	   1.335**	   (1.173,	  1.521)	  
Patient	  age	  41-­‐50	   	   1.562**	   (1.357,	  1.798)	  
Patient	  age51-­‐60	   	   1.960**	   (1.656,	  2.320)	  
Patient	  age	  60+	   	   2.265**	   (1.866,	  2.749)	  
County	  dummies±	   	   yes	   -­‐	  
Constant	   	   3.140**	   (2.111,	  4.672)	  
Random	  Effect	   	   Variance	   Standardd	  error	  𝜹jk(2)	  	  GP	   	   1.098	   0.101	  𝜹k(3)	  	  	  zip	   	   0.105	   0.043	  
Log	  Likelihood	   	   -­‐6317.19	   -­‐	  
NO	  responses	   	   11262	   -­‐	  
NO	  	  GPs	  	  	   	   3250	   -­‐	  NO	  	  Zip	   	   893	   -­‐	  Significant	  different	  from	  zero	  at	  **1%	  level	  and	  *5%level.	  ±  non	  are	  significant	  at	  a	  5%	  level.	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Table	  7.	  Multilevel	  binary	  regression	  models	  for	  time	  use	  
	  
	   Booking	   Waiting	   Consultation	  
Predictors	   	   exp	  (b)	   95%	  CI	   exp	  (b)	   95%	  CI	   exp	  (b)	   95%	  CI	  
Patient	  shortage	   	   1.135	   (0.936,	  1.378)	   1.405**	   (1.113,	  1.774)	   0.796*	   (0.656,	  0.966)	  
Log	  herfindahl	   	   0.932*	   (0.869,	  0.999)	   0.996	   (0.917,	  1.081)	   1.029	   (0.966,	  1.097)	  
GP	  Female	   	   0.717**	   (0.631,	  0.814)	   0.732**	   (0.623,	  0.859)	   0.853*	   (0.751,	  0.969)	  
GP	  age	  41-­‐50	   	   0.910	   (0.771,	  1.073)	   0.873	   (0.713,	  1.069)	   0.792**	   (0.669,	  0.939)	  
GP	  age	  51-­‐60	   	   0.943	   (0.806,	  1.103)	   0.690**	   (0.567,	  0.840)	   0.627**	   (0.534,	  0.737)	  
GP	  age	  60+	   	   0.960	   (0.797,	  1.157)	   0.671**	   (0.531,	  0.849)	   0.670**	   (0.554,	  0.812)	  
Patient	  female	   	   0.986	   (0.890,	  	  1.092)	   0.755**	   (0.669,	  0.851)	   1.179**	   (1.070,	  1.300)	  
Patient	  age	  31-­‐40	   	   1.137	   (0.996,	  1.298)	   0.923	   (0.785,	  1.084)	   1.170**	   (1.034,	  1.324)	  
Patient	  age	  41-­‐50	   	   1.070	   (0.929,	  1.233)	   1.095	   (0.925,	  1.296)	   1.458**	   (1.275,	  1.666)	  
Patient	  age51-­‐60	   	   0.884	   (0.748,	  1.044)	   1.230*	   (1.016,	  1.488)	   1.387**	   (1.188,	  1.620)	  
Patient	  age	  60+	   	   0.887	   (0.733,	  1.072)	   1.444**	   (1.169,	  1.784)	   1.908**	   (1.592,	  2.288)	  
County	  dummies±	   	   yes	   -­‐	   yes	   -­‐	   yes	   -­‐	  
Constant	   	   0.281**	   0.191	   0.161**	   (0.100,	  0.259)	   2.870**	   (1.994,	  4.131)	  
Random	  Effect	   	   Variance	   SE	   Variance	   SE	   Variance	   SE	  
	  𝜹jk(2)	  	  GP	  	  	   	   0.4429	   0.07	   0.974	   0.121	   0.86	   0.084	  𝜹k(3)	  	  Zip	   	   0.2192	   0.045	   0.244	   0.071	   0.05	   0.035	  
Log	  Likelihood	   	   -­‐5786.2	   -­‐	   -­‐4715.5	   -­‐	   -­‐6700	   -­‐	  
NO	  responses	   	   10494	   -­‐	   10556	   -­‐	   10877	   -­‐	  
NO	  GPs	  	  	   	   3189	   -­‐	   3188	   -­‐	   3217	   -­‐	  NO	  Zips	   	   885	   -­‐	   886	   -­‐	   889	   -­‐	  Significant	  different	  from	  zero	  at	  **1%	  level	  and	  *5%level.	  ±  non	  are	  significant	  at	  a	  5%	  level.	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Table	  8.Multilevel	  binary	  regression	  models	  for	  the	  interpersonal	  relationship	  
	  
Advice	   Insight	   Listening	  
Predictors	   exp	  (b)	   95%	  CI	   exp	  (b)	   95%	  CI	   exp	  (b)	   95%	  CI	  
Patient	  shortage	   0.677**	   (0.564,	  0.813)	   0.708**	   (0.589,	  0.851)	   0.568**	   (0.461,	  0.700)	  
Log	  herfindahl	   0.997	   (0.938,	  1.060)	   1.023	   (0.961,	  1.088)	   1.010	   (0.940,	  1.086)	  
GP	  Female	   0.871*	   (0.771,	  0.985)	   0.883*	   (0.781,	  0.997)	   0.877	   (0.761,	  1.010)	  
GP	  age	  41-­‐50	   0.873	   (0.743,	  1.026)	   0.840*	   (0.715,	  0.987)	   0.729**	   (0.604,	  0.881)	  
GP	  age	  51-­‐60	   0.743**	   (0.637,	  0.867)	   0.710**	   (0.608,	  0.828)	   0.584**	   (0.488,	  0.700)	  
GP	  age	  60+	   0.734**	   (0.611,	  0.882)	   0.688**	   (0.573,	  0.826)	   0.520**	   (0.421,	  0.642)	  
Patient	  female	   1.073	   (0.974,	  1.183)	   1.035	   (0.940,	  1.139)	   1.089	   (0.980,	  1.211)	  
Patient	  age	  31-­‐40	   1.066	   (0.943,	  1.205)	   1.096	   (0.971,	  1.237)	   1.134	   (0.993,	  1.294)	  
Patient	  age	  41-­‐50	   1.354**	   (1.185,	  1.547)	   1.376**	   (1.207,	  1.569)	   1.553**	   (1.343,	  1.795)	  
Patient	  age51-­‐60	   1.348**	   (1.154,	  1.574)	   1.471**	   (1.261,	  1.715)	   1.646**	   (1.388,	  1.953)	  
Patient	  age	  60+	   1.943**	   (1.615,	  2.338)	   1.981**	   (1.654,	  2.373)	   1.998**	   (1.639,	  2.436)	  
County	  dummies±	   yes	   -­‐	   yes	   -­‐	   yes	   -­‐	  
Constant	   2.607**	   (1.841,	  3.693)	   2.298**	   (1.622,	  3.258)	   4.221**	   (2.806,	  6.350)	  
Random	  Effect	   Variance	   SE	   Variance	   SE	   Variance	   SE	  𝜹jk(2)	  	  GP	   0.663	   0.0746	   0.693	   0.074	   1.068	   0.104	  𝜹k(3)	  	  	  zip	   0.05	   0.031	   0.065	   0.032	   0.113	   0.045	  
Log	  Likelihood	   -­‐6518.7	   -­‐	   -­‐6728.	  7	   -­‐	   -­‐6052.5	   -­‐	  
NO	  responses	   10904	   -­‐	   10831	   -­‐	   10912	   -­‐	  
NO	  	  GPs	  	  	   3217	   -­‐	   3214	   -­‐	   3220	   -­‐	  NO	  	  Zip	   890	   -­‐	   891	   -­‐	   891	   -­‐	  Significant	  different	  from	  zero	  at	  **1%	  level	  and	  *5%level.	  ±  non	  are	  significant	  at	  a	  5%	  level.	  	  
 	  	  
